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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Anthony G. Norman appeals, pro se, from the district court's amended 
order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After Norman pied guilty to rape, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of nine years, with three years fixed. (R., pp.16-17.) The judgment 
and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Norman, 2007 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 614 (Idaho App., October 15, 2007). 
On October 16, 2008, Norman filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief (R., pp.1-5), alleging: (1) "Ineffective assistance of counsel. Denial of right 
to counsel;" (2) 'That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously 
presented and heard, that would require the vacation of the conviction or 
sentence in the interest of justice;" (3) "Denial of proper evaluations and sex 
offender asses[s]ments. Prosecutors [sic] use of false testimony he/she knew or 
had reason to believe was false;" (4) "Police withholding favorable information 
from defense. Guilty plea was induced by promises that were not kept. 
entered a guilty plea under terms not met that were promised;" and (5) "Due 
process was not properly done on my case" (R., p.2 (capitalization altered).). 
On March 6, 2009, the district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss 
the petition on the basis that Norman failed to present evidence to establish a 
prima facie case as to any of his claims. (R., pp.16-26.) In a minute entry and 
order filed on March 17, 2009, the court noted that Norman's post-conviction 
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petition was accompanied by a cover letter in which Norman indicated that he 
was also filing a motion for appointment of counsel and supporting documents. 
(R., p.27.) The court noted, however, that the court file "contains only the 
Petition. It does not contain any of the other documents mentioned in the cover 
letter." (R., p.27.) The court thus gave Norman notice that "any request for 
appointment of counsel and/or waiver of fees will not be addressed until the 
proper documents are filed." (R., p.28.) The court also entered an Amended 
Memorandum Decision and Notice of Intent to Dismiss, giving Norman an 
additional 20 days to respond to the proposed dismissal. (R., pp.29-41.) 
Norman did not file a motion for appointment of counsel and did not 
otherwise respond to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. (See generally R.) 
On August 13, 2009, the district court entered an order dismissing Norman's 
post-conviction petition. (R., pp.42-43.) Nearly one year later, on August 2, 
2010, the district court entered an amended order of dismissal (R., pp.44-46), 
setting forth its reasons for doing so as follows: 
On August 13, 2009, this Court dismissed Petitioner's Post-
Conviction Relief Petition. On September 21, 2009, within the time 
for an appeal, Petitioner signed a Notice of Appeal. The original of 
that Notice of Appeal was received by the Bannock County 
Prosecutor's Office on September 29, 2009. The Notice of Appeal 
was not filed with this Court until July 20, 2010, when the 
prosecutor's office gave it to the deputy clerk. In an attempt to 
avoid any timeliness issue regarding the appeal and to have 
petitioner's appeal decided on the merits, this Court hereby enters 
this Amended Dismissal of Post-Conviction Relief Petition. This 
Amended Dismissal is based on IRCP 60(b)(6). Petitioner has 42 
days from the date of this Amended Dismissal to properly file a 
Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Court. 
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(R., p.44 (italicization omitted) (emphasis original); see also R., pp.47-51 (notice 
of appeal signed September 21, 2009, and bearing a certificate of mailing 
indicating Norman mailed it to the Office of the Attorney General and to the 
Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney).) Norman filed a notice of appeal timely 
only from the district court's amended order. (R., pp.70-73.) 
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ISSUES 
Norman's issue statement is set forth at page five of his Appellant's brief 
and, due to its length, is not repeated here. The state rephrases the issues on 
appeal as: 
1. Must Norman's appeal from the district court's order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief be dismissed because Norman failed to 
physically file a notice of appeal with clerk of the district court within the 
jurisdictional time limit for filing an appeal? 
2. If this Court entertains Norman's appeal, has Norman failed to show error 




This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Entertain Norman's Appeal 
A. Introduction 
Norman challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition, 
arguing that he was denied counsel and the right to a fair hearing in the district 
court. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.) This Court is without jurisdiction to consider 
Norman's appellate claims, however, because Norman failed to timely file his 
notice of appeal from the original order dismissing his post-conviction petition, 
his first notice of appeal was not timely under the mailbox rule, and the issuance 
of an amended order, which did not alter any of the terms of the original order, 
did not extend the jurisdictional period in which Norman was required to file his 
appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'"A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when 
brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to 
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free 
review. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084. 
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C. Norman's Appeal Is Untimely And Must Be Dismissed 
The Idaho Appellate Rules govern the time and manner in which appeals 
to the Idaho Supreme Court are to be filed. With respect to appeals from the 
district court, I.A.R. 14 provides: 
(a) Appeals From District Court. Any appeal as a matter of right 
from the district court may be made only by physically filing a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 
days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of 
the court on any judgment, order or decree of the district court 
appealable as a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. 
I.A.R. 14(a) (emphasis added). Pursuant to I.A.R. 20, a notice of appeal from 
the decision of a district court is not deemed filed until it is "physically received by 
the clerk of the [district] court." I.A.R. 20. "The failure to physically file a notice 
of appeal ... with the clerk of the district court ... within the time limits prescribed" 
is a jurisdictional defect requiring automatic dismissal of the appeal. I.A.R. 21; 
see also State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, _, 246 P.3d 958, 959 (2010) 
(citations omitted) ("The timely filing of a 'notice of appeal is a jurisdictional 
prerequisite to challenge a decision made by a lower court.'"). 
The district court entered its order summarily dismissing Norman's post-
conviction petition on August 13, 2009. (R., pp.42-43.) On September 21, 2009, 
within the time for appeal, Norman signed a notice of appeal and mailed it ''via 
[the] prison mail system" to the Office of the Attorney General and to the 
Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney. (R., pp.47-51.) There is no indication, 
however, that Norman delivered his September 21, 2009 notice of appeal to 
prison officials for filing with the clerk of the district court. Furthermore, the 
register of actions shows, and the district court specifically found, that the clerk of 
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the court did not receive or file Norman's September 21, 2009 notice of appeal 
until July 20, 2010, the date the prosecutor's office apparently delivered it to the 
deputy clerk. (ROA, p.1 (included in clerk's record after Index); R., p.44.) Thus, 
regardless of Norman's intentions, the record affirmatively establishes that 
Norman failed to physically file a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district 
court within the time limits prescribed for appeal. 
The state acknowledges that the Idaho appellate courts have applied the 
"mailbox rule," such that a pro se inmate's notice of appeal is deemed filed "at 
the moment such notices are delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the 
court clerk." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 204, 786 P.2d 594, 595 (Ct. App. 
1990), cited with approval in Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 917 P.2d 796 
(1996); see also Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 90-91,137 P.3d 475, 477-78 (Ct. 
App. 2006) (deeming appeal timely filed where record showed that, within the 
time for appeal, Hayes delivered notice of appeal to prison officials for mailing to 
the clerk of the district court). The "mailbox rule" is not applicable in this case, 
however, because, although the certificate of mailing indicates that Norman 
mailed his notice of appeal "via [the] prison mail system" on September 21, 
2009, the certificate of mailing also indicates that Norman did not even attempt 
to mail his notice of appeal to the clerk of the district court. (See R., p.51 
(certificate of mailing indicating notice of appeal mailed only to the Office of the 
Attorney General and the Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney).) Thus, this is 
not a case like Munson and Lee where there was a delay, beyond the pro se 
inmates' control, between the prison officials' receipt of an inmate's court 
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documents and the formal filing by the court clerk. Nor is it a case like Hayes 
where, although Hayes timely delivered his notice of appeal to prison authorities 
for mailing to the district court clerk, the court clerk never received the notice of 
appeal, again for reasons beyond Hayes' control. Rather, the difficulty in this 
case is that Norman did not address his September 21, 2009 notice of appeal to 
the court clerk at all, instead addressing it only to parties who had no duty to file 
the document with the clerk of the court. (R., p.51.) Accordingly, the "mailbox 
rule" is inapplicable and does not render timely filed the September 21, 2009 
notice of appeal, which Norman never mailed to the clerk of the court. 
Recognizing that Norman failed to timely file his September 21, 2009 
notice of appeal with the court clerk, the district court attempted to enlarge 
Norman's time for appeal by entering an amended order dismissing Norman's 
post-conviction petition, citing as its authority to do so Rule 60(b)(6), I.R.C.P. 
(R., pp.44-45.) The district court erred in doing so because neither I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(6), nor any other court rule, permits a district court to enlarge the 
jurisdictional time limits for appeal. See Ciccone, 150 Idaho at_, 246 P.3d at 
960 ("[N]either our court rules nor case law recognize the power of a district court 
to enlarge the time for appeal."). In fact, the Idaho appellate courts have 
consistently held that, "where an appeal from the judgment is the proper remedy, 
'Rule 60(b)(6) may not be used as an end-run around the time limits of I.AR. 
14."' Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1094, 793 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Ct. App. 
1990) (quoting First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Stauffer, 112 Idaho 133, 142, 
730 P.2d 1053, 1062 (Ct. App. 1986)); accord Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 
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672, 115 P.3d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus, the district court's reliance on 
Rule 60(b)(6) solely as a mechanism to "avoid any timeliness issue regarding the 
appeal" and allow Norman to have his "appeal decided on the merits" (R., p.44), 
while laudable, was wholly misplaced and did not extend the time in which 
Norman was required to appeal from the original order of dismissal. See 
Ciccone, 150 Idaho at _, 246 P .3d at 960-61 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted) ("[T]he time within which a losing party must seek [appellate] review 
cannot be enlarged just because the lower court in its discretion thinks it should 
be enlarged."). 
Norman did timely file a notice of appeal from the amended order of 
dismissal entered on August 2, 2010. (See R., pp.44, 70) The timeliness of 
Norman's appeal from the amended order does not confer jurisdiction on this 
Court to entertain Norman's challenge to the dismissal of his post-conviction 
petition, however, because the amended order is substantively identical to the 
original order of dismissal. (Compare R., pp.42-43 with R., pp.44-46.) It is 
settled law that entry of an amended final order does not necessarily "extend the 
period for filing an appeal or begin that period anew." State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 
866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996). Rather, it makes an appeal timely 
only as to matters actually altered by the amendment. The appellate court does 
not have jurisdiction to address matters unaffected by the amendments to the 
order. Ciccone, 150 Idaho at_, 246 P.3d at 961; Payan, 128 Idaho at 867, 
920 P.2d at 83. 
9 
With the exception of the district court's explanation regarding its reasons 
for entering an amended order, the amended order of dismissal is identical to the 
original order and did not alter any of the terms from which Norman now 
attempts to appeal. (Compare R., pp. 42-43 with R., pp.44-46.) Because 
Norman could have challenged the summary dismissal of his petition upon the 
entry of the original order of dismissal in August 2009, his August 16, 2010 
notice of appeal, filed well beyond the 42-day jurisdictional limit of I.AR. 14, is 
untimely. Appellate review of the district court's order dismissing Norman's post-
conviction petition is therefore precluded. Ciccone, 150 Idaho at_, 246 P.3d 
at 961; Payan, 128 Idaho at 867, 920 at 83. 
11. 
Norman Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-
Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Even if this Court deems Norman's appeal timely, this Court should 
decline to consider Norman's challenge to the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition because Norman has failed to support his appellate 
claims with argument and authority. Alternatively, Norman has failed to establish 
the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
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affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. This Court Should Decline To Consider Norman's Appellate Claims 
Because They Are Unsupported By Argument And Authority 
It is well established in Idaho law that an appellate court will not consider 
a claim of error that is not supported by both argument and citation to authority. 
State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 518, 164 P.3d 790, 798 (2007); State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 
263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by 
propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."). 
Norman asks this Court to grant him relief from the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition, but he has failed to support 
any of his appellate claims with citation to legal authority and has offered virtually 
no appellate argument. 1 (See generally, Appellant's brief, pp.4-16.) Because 
Norman has failed to support his claims with argument and authority, the claims 
are waived and must be disregarded. 
1 Norman does argue that the district court denied him counsel (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-7), but he has failed to demonstrate from the record that he ever asked the 
district court to appoint him counsel. The district court specifically found that, 
although Norman indicated in a cover letter accompanying his post-conviction 
petition that he was also filing a motion for the appointment of counsel, no such 
motion was actually filed. (R., pp.27-28.) The court gave Norman the 
opportunity to file a motion for the appointment of counsel before it finally 
dismissed Norman's petition (R., pp.27-28, 40-41), but Norman failed to do so 
(see generally R.). Norman's claim that he was denied counsel is therefore 
without merit. 
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D. Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Norman's Claims, He Has 
Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing 
His Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), 
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. & (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." & 
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Norman raised a number of claims in his petition but did not support any 
of them with admissible evidence. (R., pp.1-5.) The allegations were bare and 
conclusory and did not establish a genuine issue of material fact that would have 
entitled him to a hearing on any of his claims. The district court gave Norman 
the opportunity to correct the deficiencies in his petition (R., pp.16-26, 29-41 ), 
but Norman made no attempt to do so (R., p.42). Because Norman did not even 
attempt to support his petition with any admissible evidence, the district court 
correctly dismissed the petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Norman's appeal. 
Alternatively, the state requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Norman's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DA TED th is 31 st day of October 2011. 
·Q -~ ~f..'.FLEMI~ -
Deputy Attorney General 
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